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Striking Back Against Retaliatory Discrimination: How
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White
Expands Protections for Employees Under Title VIl's
Participation and Opposition Clauses
What happens when someone claims she has been discriminated
against at work? We usually focus on two actors: the aggrieved
employee and the employer. The reports, charges, and court filings,
however, often reveal a wider cast of characters, including the
claimant's coworkers, supervisors, and occasionally organized groups
in the workplace or community. Fellow employees may assist their
coworker in filing the claim or by offering to testify, or they may shun
or retaliate against the claimant. Supervisors may also have a role
that goes beyond simply implementing the policies of upper
management.
Some supervisors may refuse to comply with
discriminatory or retaliatory orders, while others may engage in
retaliatory behavior on their own initiative, even despite management
directives to the contrary. Finally, outside organizations such as labor
unions, civil rights groups and other community organizations, and
local human rights and human relations boards may also become
involved, simply by assisting employees with their individual claims,
or by using an individual's grievance as part of a larger collective
strategy to address other problems in the workplace or the
community.' The social context of the workplace is important in
investigating, settling, and resolving discrimination claims.
"Context matters," Justice Breyer stated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v.

1. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination
Disputes as a Critical Prescriptionfor Unions To Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB.

& EMP. L. 55, 108-10 (2004) (advocating that labor unions provide legal services in
employment discrimination cases to groups of unorganized black workers); Karl E. Klare,
Toward New Strategies for Low Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 272 (1995)
(explaining the use of strategic litigation by the Justice for Janitors union campaign to
enforce "statutory rights," such as those under Title VII); Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons
from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 ME. L. REV. 157, 179-80 (2003)

(describing how female farmworkers and their advocates have used employment laws such
as Title VII to advance collective goals). For a more critical view of the benefits and
limitations of individual employment lawsuits in promoting larger social justice goals, see
also Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 440-45

(1995).
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White, clarifying the new standard for retaliation claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In Burlington Northern, the
Court held that under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, 4 a
plaintiff must show that the employer's action was "materially
adverse" and would have " 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' "I Instead of
requiring a plaintiff to show a discrete event or an "adverse
employment action," this new standard considers the alleged
retaliatory action along with the " 'constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations and relationships' " in the workplace.6
Setting a standard for claims of retaliation that "focus[es] on the
materiality of the challenged action and the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position" provides more
protection to these third parties, as it would presumably be easier to
deter a reasonable worker from supporting someone else's claim than
her own.7
This Recent Development focuses on the impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington Northern on these other actors,
specifically those who participate in the process of supporting a Title
VII claim or resisting a discriminatory policy in the workplace.8 It
will argue that the standard in Burlington Northern-defining
retaliation as a practice likely to " 'dissuade[] a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination' "9-- increases
protection to those who may act in a supporting role in a
discrimination claim. This added protection will encourage these
"supporting actors" to participate in Title VII proceedings and may
make it easier to use collective strategies to address discrimination in
the workplace.

2. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). Throughout the remainder of this Recent Development,
the Supreme Court Reporter is used for citations to Burlington Northernbecause pinpoint

citations to the United States Reporter were unavailable at the time of publication.
3. Id. at 2415.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
5. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

6. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82
(1998)).

7. Id. at 2416.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (making it illegal for "an employer to discriminate

against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participatedin any manner in an investigation,proceeding, or
hearing under this title" (emphasis added)).
9. Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
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This Recent Development will begin by summarizing the Court's
holding in Burlington Northern and comparing it to the standard
previously applied in the lower federal courts to show how Burlington
Northern expanded the types of activities that are protected from
employer retaliation. Next, it will review the prior case law under
Title VII that addressed retaliation claims made by other parties who
opposed an employer's discriminatory practice, testified for a plaintiff
in a trial or other proceeding, or otherwise assisted with a claim. Two
cases will be examined in detail to illustrate how the Burlington
Northern analysis could be applied to claims involving retaliatory
discrimination against third parties. This piece will then conclude by
showing how the new Burlington Northern standard will make it
easier for third parties to support a Title VII claimant in the
workplace.
Even though Burlington Northern did not involve a third-party
retaliation claim, a brief examination of its facts is helpful to
understand the Court's emphasis on materiality and context. Plaintiff
Sheila White was hired as a forklift driver at the Burlington Northern
rail yard in Memphis, Tennessee. 10 White was assigned to the job of
track laborer, which included her primary duty of operating the
forklift, but also involved other tasks such as replacing portions of
tracks, cutting brush, and cleaning trash and spilled cargo from the
right-of-way.11
The only woman in her department, White
experienced sexual harassment by superiors and coworkers who
believed that women should not be working on the railroad. 2 After
she reported this discriminatory conduct, responsibility for operating
the forklift was given to a "more senior man" and White was left with
the more physically demanding and dirtier tasks of the track laborer
position.1 3
White believed that this reassignment was retaliation for her
earlier report of sexual harassment, a violation of the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII. 14 A jury found in White's favor and awarded
10. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2004).
11. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
12. White reported that her immediate supervisor had made "insulting and
inappropriate remarks to her in front of her male colleagues." Id.; see also White, 364 F.3d
at 792 (describing the "general anti-woman feeling" among many of the employees at the
Memphis rail yard).
13. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2409; see also White, 364 F.3d at 792-93
(describing the role that coworkers' complaints about White's assignment to the forklift
tasks may have played in her reassignment).
14. White filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). She later filed two
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damages. On appeal, a panel at the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial
court decision, but the case was later heard en banc, and the full Sixth
Circuit upheld the jury verdict in White's favor.'5 The court split over
which standard to apply in order to determine which actions are
retaliatory under the statute, mirroring a split among the courts of
appeals themselves. 6
When Burlington Northern reached the Supreme Court, the
Court was left with the task of addressing the conflicting retaliation
standards that had divided the Sixth Circuit and other federal appeals
courts. 7 Prior to the Burlington Northern decision, many federal
courts of appeals had taken a more restrictive approach to their
interpretation of the retaliation provision, requiring an "adverse
employment action," which courts defined as a "materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment."' 8 The broader
approach, favored by other circuits, asked whether the alleged
retaliatory action would be "material to a reasonable employee."19 In
adopting the broader approach, the Supreme Court made it easier for
plaintiffs in most circuits to assert retaliation claims that would
survive summary judgment.20 For example, this new test makes it
more likely that a plaintiff who complains of retaliation but cannot

additional retaliation charges, the first claiming that she was placed under surveillance by
management, and the second after she was suspended for thirty-seven days without pay
for alleged insubordination. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2409. She was later
reinstated and received back pay for the period of her suspension after the
insubordination incident was investigated under a union-management grievance
procedure. Id.
15. Id. at 2410.
16. Id. at 2410-11.
17. Id. at 2415. The en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit resulted in a majority
opinion and two concurrences, each adopting a different standard for retaliation. See
White, 364 F.3d at 789.
18. The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had previously taken the restrictive
approach. E.g., White, 364 F.3d at 795; Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th
Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997). Even more limiting
was the standard formerly applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which required an
"ultimate employment decision" in retaliation cases. E.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686,
692 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying a similar standard). An ultimate employment decision was
defined as "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating." Mattern,
104 F.3d at 707.
19. See Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
20. The Ninth Circuit is the one exception; it had relied on the EEOC's preferred
statutory interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, which was broader than the
holding in Burlington Northern. Previously, the Ninth Circuit had defined retaliation as
conduct "based on retaliatory motive and.., reasonably likely to deter the charging party
or others." Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000).
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point to an adverse employment action (such as being fired or passed
over for promotion) can still get her claims before a jury.
In order for a third-party plaintiff2 l to make out a prima facie
case for retaliation under the Title VII anti-retaliation provision, he

must show three things: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity
under the statute, either under the participation clause or the

opposition clause;

2

(2) that his employer retaliated against him in

such a way that "well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination' ,,;23
and (3)
that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the retaliatory action. 24
The Burlington Northern decision has
expanded the kinds of activities that will meet the second element of

a claim, the retaliatory action.' Plaintiffs will still have to prove that
they engaged in a protected activity and show the link between the
protected activity and the retaliation. But with more actions
qualifying as retaliation under Burlington Northern, more plaintiffs

may get the chance to prove these elements to a jury instead of to a
judge reviewing a motion for summary judgment.26
Before a plaintiff shows an allegedly retaliatory act of her

employer, however, she must first show that she engaged in a
protected activity under the statute. Actions taken by employees,
whether taken by the claimant or a third party, must fall under either
the participation clause or the opposition clause to be protected

21. In this context, "third party" means a person who is not the original claimant but a
person who has supported the claim or opposed the practice.
22. See infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
23. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (quoting
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
24. There are three ways to show a causal connection: direct admission by the
employer, the "pretext" proof scheme adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 802-08 (1973), or the "mixed motive" scheme
set out by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 238-55
(1989). Many claims fail because they cannot establish a satisfactory causal link for
reasons that are beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
25. At least the decision has broadened the definition in most circuits. The Ninth
Circuit had a more expansive view prior to Burlington Northern, and since the Court
adopted the test already employed by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, it has stayed the
same for those circuits. For all other circuits, however, Burlington Northern significantly
expanded the range of activities that can be considered retaliation. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text.
26. Burlington Northern's Impact Assessed in ABA-Hosted Teleconference, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 158, at A-12 (Aug. 16, 2006) (predicting that "there will be fewer
summary judgment decisions in favor of the employer, ... many more cases will go to
trial[, and] ...[m]ore claims of retaliation will also be brought").
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activities under Title VII.2 7 The protections offered by these two
clauses are directly related to the statute's purpose. Instead of
establishing an inspection regime to ensure compliance, enforcement
is triggered by employee complaints. In such a scheme, protecting the
charging parties, as well as those who support them, is crucial.28
Since the testimony of others often provides essential evidence in
support of a claim, the participation clause embraces nearly any kind
of testimony as a protected activity. 29
Testimony that is not
voluntary-or even against one's own interest-falls within the broad
protective scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.3" To invoke
the protections of the participation clause, a witness's testimony or
participation does not even have to pass a reasonableness test.' In
Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, a witness who
gave a deposition in the Title VII sex discrimination suit of a former
colleague strayed from the issues in the suit and gave a freewheeling
monologue on the problems with her own former superior.32 After
her current supervisor read the deposition, he decided not to extend
her employment beyond a probationary period.3 Despite her verbal

27. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment.., because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
'made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (emphasis
added); see also 2 PAUL N. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 18.06 (3d ed. 2005)
(describing the protection given to employee actions that meet the requirements of the
participation clause and the opposition clause).
28. Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 7.4 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the amount of protection available under Title VII to charging employees and
those who have assisted them). The language of Title VII provides even broader
protection to employee "assistance and participation" in Title VII proceedings than the
analogous provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"). Pettaway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18
(5th Cir. 1969). Both the FLSA and the NLRA protect employees who made charges
under the statutes or gave testimony about a prohibited practice. Id. That Title VII,
passed some thirty years later, broadened the category of protected activity to include
"assistance and participation" as well is an indication of Congress's intent. Id.
29. COX, supra note 27, 18.06.
30. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
testimony that was compelled by subpoena at a fellow employee's grievance hearing was a
protected activity under Title VII); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1185-86
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee who grudgingly gave a deposition describing
his own role in creating a hostile environment in a Title VII sexual harassment suit was
protected from discharge on the basis of his testimony).
31. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411,413-14 (4th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 412.
33. Id. at 413.
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detours, Glover's statements in the deposition were found to be
protected by the participation clause.' Citing the need for unfiltered
witness testimony, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[r]eading a
reasonableness test into [the] participation clause would do violence
to the text of that provision and would undermine the objectives of
Title VII. '' 35 Witnesses who may have an improper motivation to
testify are similarly protected. An employee's participation in an
investigation of sexual harassment by a manager was held to be
protected under the participation clause, despite the employer's
contention that the charges were "fabricated" and motivated by the
testifying employee's vendetta against the manager.36
A simple offer to testify may also qualify for protection under
the participation clause, even if the testimony is never given.37 In Jute
v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., an employee's agreement to testify in
a coworker's Title VII hostile work environment claim and her listing
as a favorable witness in the case was sufficient to qualify her for
protection under the participation clause.38 The plaintiff in Jute
agreed to give a deposition and saved her vacation days for that
purpose.39 However, before she could testify, her coworker's case
settled.'
Despite the fact that she never gave her scheduled
testimony, the Second Circuit found that
[i]t would be destructive of [the statute's] purpose to leave an
employee who is poised to support a co-worker's discrimination
claim wholly unprotected....

[F]or example ... an employer

could freely retaliate against a Title VII whistleblower, as long
as it did so before the employee actually testified. Placing a
voluntary witness into this kind of legal limbo would impede
remedial mechanisms by denying interested parties "access to
the unchilled testimony of witnesses."41
Protection for employees under the opposition clause is nearly as
expansive as that under the participation clause.42 Employees who
34. Id. at 414.
35. Id.
36. Kubico v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 549-50 (4th Cir. 1999).
37. Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2005).
38. Id. at 175.
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 175 (quoting Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
42. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 7.5. However, cases under the opposition
clause that raise issues of employee disloyalty or disruption of the employer's business are
subject to a more critical inquiry than cases under the participation clause. Id.; see also
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oppose an illegal practice in the workplace that affects their

coworkers or refuse to carry out discriminatory acts against other
employees are generally protected under the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII.43 A court may inquire into the methods used
in the opposition, but most reasonable forms of opposition do merit
protection." One such protected form of opposition to a practice that
violates Title VII is the reporting of discrimination against other
employees to a superior or a government agency like the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). For example, in a
recent case,45 the Third Circuit found the actions of white police

officers to be protected under the opposition clause when they
reported their sergeant for repeatedly using derogatory language to
refer to black officers in their unit and discriminating against the
black officers in assigning shifts. 46 As long as the white officers had a
reasonable belief that such conduct did indeed violate Title VII, they
were justified in opposing it spontaneously, when it occurred.47 The
Moore court explained, "As soon as a witness of such conduct
reasonably believes unlawful discrimination has occurred, the anti-

retaliatory provisions will protect their opposition to it. They are not
required to collect enough evidence of discrimination to put the
4
discrimination case before a jury before they blow the whistle.
The opposition clause also protects employees who refuse to

participate in an action that they reasonably believe violates Title
VII. Many of these cases involve management-level employees who
refuse to implement a discriminatory order regarding promotion,

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-06 (1973) (involving a black civil
rights activist who engaged in activities that were illegal and disruptive of the employer's
business as a way of protesting the employer's racially discriminatory employment
practices).
43. The precise limits of protected activities under the opposition clause are beyond
the scope of this Recent Development, but plaintiffs engaged in opposing an employer
practice generally have to meet a reasonableness or good faith test. See SULLIVAN ET AL.,
supra note 28, § 7.5.
44. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 258-60 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that an employee's removal of key documents from her supervisor's desk was not
a protected activity under the opposition clause). But see Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132
F.3d 442, 445-47 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that an employee who found documents on his
work computer detailing planned layoffs and turned them over to his lawyer engaged in
protected activity under the opposition clause as long as he held a good faith belief that his
employer was engaged in unlawful discrimination).
45. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006).
46. Id. at 344-45.
47. Id. at 344.
48. Id. at 345.

1232

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

retention or discipline. In Thomas v. City of Beaverton,49 an
employee involved in the hiring process refused to exclude a qualified
applicant due to her involvement in a prior discrimination suit." The
employee was put on probation and later terminated for refusing to
discriminate against the applicant. 1 Similarly, a personnel director's
refusal to fire an African-American employee because of his race was
also a protected activity under the opposition clause. 2 Refusing to
believe a pretextual reason for firing the employee, the personnel
director told his superiors he would not fire the5 3employee for what he
believed was a solely racially motivated reason.
Cases interpreting the participation and opposition clauses, in
keeping with Title VII's statutory purpose, offer broad protection to
the types of activities that third parties can engage in to support a
claim of discrimination or oppose an unlawful practice. The courts'
analysis in this area reflects the realities of the workplace by applying
a reasonableness test, instead of requiring a third party to come
forward with absolute proof that Title VII is being violated at work.
The application of Burlington Northern to third-party claims also
reflects the realities of life at work. A standard based on material
adversity from the perspective of a reasonable employee will cover
many retaliatory actions that are common, yet do not reach the level
of an adverse employment action. The Burlington Northern standard
is also easily adapted to the cases of third-party claimants who,
because they act altruistically, may find more attempts at retaliation
to be material. Finally, the Burlington Northern standard is realistic
when viewed in the context of the social pressures that discourage
individuals from opposing discrimination.
The new standard under Burlington Northern is more realistic in
the sense that it may more accurately reflect the kinds of retaliatory
activity that third parties are likely to face. Rather than one discrete
adverse employment action, third parties may instead be subjected to
a pattern of retaliatory activity to discourage their participation or
opposition. The Jute case is illustrative of the many forms of pressure
that an employer can bring to bear on an employee who participates

49. 379 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2004).
50. Id. at 806-07.
51. Id. at 807. The applicant in question had filed suit against the city previously for
failure to promote based on race discrimination. Id. at 806.
52. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1998).
53. Id. at 550.
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in a Title VII proceeding.54 The plaintiff in the case, Donna Jute, had
been named as a favorable witness and had offered to testify in her
coworker's sex discrimination lawsuit.5" Before she found out that
she had been named as a favorable witness, or even that her
colleague's case had settled, Jute was removed from a work team that
had "offered [her] a unique opportunity for career advancement."5 6
When she inquired about the reason for her removal, the human
resources manager told her to "find another job," and that
57
harassment at work was "never going to stop.
Jute did not find another job, and the retaliatory actions
continued. On their own, these actions would not have reached the
threshold for retaliation that many circuits would have applied prior
to Burlington Northern.58 Taken together, however, these actions
placed significant pressure on Jute for having volunteered to assist
her coworker. To earn extra money, Jute had taught a companysponsored aerobics class for employees, but after being named as a
witness, her class was cancelled.59 She did not receive a promotion
she had been promised.'
Later, she was told that could not be
promoted unless she worked night hours, despite the fact that she had
no child care for her daughter during the night shift.6' Jute was not
allowed to attend business trips with the salaried employees in her
work team, which cut her off from valuable experience and training
needed for a promotion.6 2 Finally, she fared poorly during a
corporate restructuring, which she believed was due, in part, to her
participation in the Title VII process.6 3

54. Jute v. Hamilton Sunstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005). The facts
described in Jute and Moore, derived from an appellate court opinion, reflect the
procedural posture of the case (appeal of summary judgment disposition in favor of the
defendant). As such, the facts are construed in favor of the plaintiffs. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). While not completely objective, these facts
are illustrative in showing the kinds of actions that the plaintiffs themselves considered to
be part of the retaliation.
55. Jute, 420 F.3d at 169-70.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 18-20.
59. Jute, 420 F.3d at 170.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 170 n.2. Jute's situation is similar to that of the plaintiff in Washington v.
Illinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005), where the Seventh Circuit
found a change in an employee's work hours was materially adverse due to her child care
responsibilities. Id. at 662.
62. Jute, 420 F.3d at 170.
63. Id.
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The police officer plaintiffs in Moore faced a similar pattern of
retaliation.'
These white officers were friendly with the black
officers in their unit and opposed discriminatory treatment against
them. Because of this, the white officers were subjected to some of
the same treatment as their black colleagues, including being assigned
less desirable shifts, being assigned to more difficult or dangerous
duties, and being denied break time.65 Their superiors discussed the
officers' personal affairs in front of others and monitored their
locations more closely.6 6 One officer reported that a captain told him

he would "make [the officer's] life a living nightmare" if he reported
his sergeant's discrimination against black officers to the EEOC.67
Several officers were threatened with being transferred to the district
farthest from their homes. 68
The retaliatory activities against the white officers who had
opposed discrimination in the squad took more menacing forms as
well. When two of the white officers were shot while on duty, they
felt that they did not receive the proper followup after the incident.
One of them stated, "[B]ecause of our association with the black
officers, we weren't getting the backup, like, we would have ... if ...

we didn't associate with them."69 One officer was assaulted by a
fellow officer following an incident that he believed was precipitated
by his criticism of the racism in the squad.7" Following the filing of
the officers' Title VII lawsuit, one officer was subjected to multiple
"sick checks" at his home.7 The police department performed thirty
sick checks for one of the officers in a two-month period.72 Another
officer reported that a police captain intervened in his child custody
case.

73

The Jute and Moore cases show the variety of forms that
retaliatory action can take in the workplace. They also show how
64. See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 338-40 (3d Cir. 2006). Moore reached
the court of appeals after Burlington Northern was decided by the Supreme Court and
follows that case's analysis of what constitutes retaliation. Id. at 341-42.
65. Id. at 335, 337. For example, one of the white officers questioned why a black
coworker was ordered to stand outside in the cold and the rain and, as a result, was
ordered to stand outside with her. Id. at 335.
66. Id. at 338.
67. Id. at 337.
68. Id. at 337-38.
69. Id. at 336.
70. Id. at 339.
71. Id. at 338. "Sick checks" are performed occasionally to make sure that officers on
medical leave are at home and have a legitimate medical excuse. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 340.
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some retaliatory acts may have a significant impact on an employee's
life, even if they did not meet the pre-Burlington Northern standards
of an adverse employment action or an ultimate employment
decision. The loss of an additional source of income from teaching a
class, or having to choose between the possibility of promotion and
adequate child care, can have a significant impact on an employee's
life and her decision to support a coworker's charge or oppose an
employer's discriminatory practice. In the words of the Supreme
Court, these actions are "materially adverse."74 Other retaliatory
actions that did not meet the more restrictive standards could put an
employee in serious danger, such as when a police officer does not
receive backup following a shooting or when officers are assigned to a
more dangerous beat.
The impact of these actions may be even more significant
because they are not directed toward the person or persons who are
the object of discrimination, but instead toward third parties who call
discriminatory practices into question or attempt to remediate them.
For this reason, the Burlington Northern standard, which draws the
line at conduct that "would have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination,' " is particularly
important.7 5 These third parties do not act in their own direct
interest, so they may be more vulnerable to pressures that stop short
of ultimate employment actions. They may be the weak link in the
chain of evidence and inferences that a plaintiff needs to prevail on a
discrimination claim.76
Viewing retaliation from the experience of third parties who
participate in Title VII proceedings or oppose discriminatory
practices suggests that Burlington Northern's contextual reading of
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII may be more appropriate
than the alternatives. This perspective addresses some of the
concerns in response to the Court's "reasonable employee" standard.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito criticized the Court's majority for
creating a sort of sliding scale for retaliation, suggesting that plaintiffs
with less serious claims would be more easily dissuaded, while those

74. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006); see also
Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying the
material adversity standard in a case where a mother was denied the flexible schedule she
had relied on to care for her disabled son).
75. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).
76. See id. at 2412-14 ("Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad
protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of
the Act's primary objective depends.").
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with more serious claims would be able to withstand more severe
retaliation." The result, Alito suggested, could be that the same
employer action could be considered retaliatory in some contexts and
not in others under the "reasonable employee" standard.78
Justice Alito was correct to point out that some of the victims of
unlawful discrimination in the workplace may have incentives to
continue with their claims despite relatively minor retaliatory actions.
However, such personal incentives do not apply to third-party
participants in a Title VII proceeding. The threat of being transferred
to a faraway precinct or the pressure to work the night shift may not
dissuade some workers from supporting their own Title VII claims,
from which they stand to benefit and possibly win money damages.
To a reasonable worker who acts to support a colleague, or to remedy
a practice that he finds objectionable but that does not affect him
personally, such acts may be enough. To borrow an example from the
Seventh Circuit, "petty bureaucratic nastiness" in retaliation for filing
a "self-interested" discrimination charge may not rise to the level of
materiality required under Title VII. 79 The court pointed out,
however, that "it takes less to deter an altruistic act than to deter a
self-interested one," and suggested that slights such as a moving an
"altruistic" third-party claimant to a smaller cubicle or subjecting him
to annoying music throughout the workday may be material and
therefore discriminatory.80
Protecting "altruistic" claimants from the types of retaliation that
are likely to discourage their claims also acknowledges the difficulty
involved in opposing discrimination. Social science research indicates
that when individuals identify conduct as discriminatory, they often
refrain from confronting such behavior due to a perception that the
costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. 8' The mere potential for
retaliation serves to maintain the status quo.82 When retaliatory
activity occurs, it deters not only the opponent, but also sends a
message to other employees that such confrontational activities are
futile. This message can be particularly harmful in organizations that
have a history of tolerating discrimination and discouraging
opposition to it, making these workplaces even more resistant to

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2418-22 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
See Washington, 420 F.3d at 661-62.
Id.
See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 36-39 (2005).
See id.
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change. 83 If employees see that a coworker who speaks up about
discrimination in the workplace is later denied an expected
promotion or refused backup in a dangerous situation, the lesson is
learned. Knowing that they have the possibility of legal redress may
not encourage all employees, but it at least removes the impression
that an employer can mistreat those who speak up with impunity.
Since "past outcomes of responses to [discrimination] influence
expectancies for future outcomes," additional protection for
employees who oppose unfair practices may help to create the kind of
positive feedback that is necessary to challenge institutional
discrimination. 8'
The new standard in Burlington Northern as applied to the
participation and opposition clauses also creates incentives for
employers to remedy discrimination in the workplace because it
opens them up to greater potential liability." Employers who take
the initiative to train management and develop internal grievance
procedures to address employee complaints will find it easier to
successfully defend against retaliation claims in the future.86 In order
to prevent liability, however, such policies will have to be put into
practice, not just added to an employee handbook and then ignored
in day-to-day interactions. 87 Additionally, some employers may adapt
to the ruling by requiring approval by upper management or an
attorney before carrying out disciplinary actions.88
Employers may want to pay special attention to the needs of
employees with caregiving responsibilities.
Under the older
standards, denying flexibility in the work day to attend to family
needs did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action and
was not actionable as retaliation. These accommodations, however,
are certainly material; their impact is felt by employees as much as a
83. Id. at 36-39, 39 n.61. Other workplace protections may make some workers more
likely to challenge discrimination. One example is Burlington Northern plaintiff Sheila
White, who was protected by a union at her workplace, giving her more protection from a
retaliatory firing than a non-union at-will employee. Attorneys Predict Wide-Ranging
Impact of White Decision on Title VII, Other Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 224, at C1 (Nov. 21, 2006).
84. Brake, supra note 81, at 39 n.61 (citing Deborah Erdos Knopp et al., Determinants
of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 687, 699-700 (1997)).
85. Burlington Northern's Impact Assessed in ABA-Hosted Teleconference, supra note
26, at A-11 to A-12.
86. Id.
87. See Attorneys Predict Wide-Ranging Impact of White Decision on Title VII, Other
Cases, supra note 83, at C-1 to C-2.
88. Id.
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The case of Washington v.

Illinois Department of Revenue89 is instructive

for employers,

particularly since the Supreme Court seems to have relied on it in
Burlington Northern.9 In Washington, an employee who had worked

a different schedule, which allowed her to leave work early to care for
her disabled son, was moved back to a regular nine-to-five shift after
filing a civil rights complaint. The Seventh Circuit noted that the
change "would not be materially adverse for a normal employee-but
Washington was not a normal employee ....

Working 9-to-5 was a

materially adverse change for her, even though it would not have
been for 99% of the staff."91 While the Washington court was correct
in pointing out how inflexible scheduling may have the power to deter
a discrimination claimant, it appears to have understated the need for
such accommodations. Many "normal employees" must balance
work and family responsibilities.' There are some indications that
courts are beginning to view discrimination claims that involve family
and caregiving responsibilities more favorably.9 3 Given this trend,

employers should take special care to avoid creating material
adversity for employees who may depend on policies such as flexible
scheduling or leave.
An expanded definition of retaliatory activity may also make it
easier for employees to act collectively and address problems in the
workplace. Because the broader protections against retaliation
"extend[] protection beyond the immediate targets of discrimination
to include protection for any person who opposes it," confronting
inequality at work can become everyone's business.9 4 In this way,
"discrimination law allows the mobilization of collective strategies for
opposing inequality instead of seeing discrimination as only the
'
problem of the targeted individual."95
Knowing that the law affords
them protection against a wider variety of potential employer

89.
90.
91.
92.

420 F. 3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405,2410-16 (2006).
Washington, 420 F.3d at 662.
See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS

COLL. OF THE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED:

WHEN "OPTING

OUT" IS NOT AN OPTION 3-7 (2006), http://www.uchastings.edu/site-files/WLL/one
sickchild.pdf (relying on a study of union arbitrations involving work/family conflicts).
93. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family

CaregiversWho Are DiscriminatedAgainst on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 124-30
(2003).
94. Brake, supra note 81, at 74-75.
95. Id.
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retaliation may make employees more likely to oppose a
discriminatory practice, even if they are not its direct victims.
This broader view also recognizes that a discriminatory or hostile
atmosphere at work harms more workers than just those who are the
target of the discrimination. This is particularly important in certain
jobs-such as those of police officers-where the ability to work
together with one's coworkers is essential.96 Two cases illustrate the
ripple effect that discrimination may have on those who are not its
victims. In Childress v. City of Richmond9 7 and Walker v. Mueller
Industries," white male police officers and a white union steward,
respectively, alleged a derivative cause of action under Title VII.99
Essentially, the plaintiffs in these two cases claimed that they suffered
when working relationships with women and blacks in the workplace
were impaired due to a hostile work environment. 10 0 While neither
derivative claim was successful,'0 ' the lawsuits demonstrate that
discrimination against certain employees can have a ripple effect that
extends beyond those personally affected by discriminatory activity.
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress
anticipated the possibility that employees may be intimidated and
may feel pressure not to participate in the process or oppose
discriminatory practices. For this reason, Congress allowed some
claims to be brought on behalf of individuals by organized groups,
such as civil rights organizations and labor unions."° This change
reflects both the practical difficulties of being a lone voice of dissent
in a hostile workplace, as well as the history of the civil rights
movement that led to the passage of Title VII. 103
The civil rights movement pursued a strategy of collective action
to address discrimination against individuals in the workplace and
other areas of life. The expanded protection from retaliatory acts
96. See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 335-36 (3d Cir. 2006).
97. 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998).
98. 408 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2005).
99. See Walker, 408 F.3d at 329-30; Childress, 134 F.3d at 1206-07.
100. See Walker, 408 F.3d at 329-30; Childress, 134 F.3d at 1206-07.
101. See Walker, 408 F.3d at 334-35 (affirming district court's order granting summary
judgment for defendants); Childress, 134 F.3d at 1207 (dismissal of plaintiff's claim
affirmed by an equally divided court).
102. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.8.2 (suggesting that the 1972
amendments to Title VII were added for the purpose of allowing such organizations to sue
on behalf of victims of discrimination who feared retaliation if they sued themselves); see
also 118 CONG. REC. 7563, 7564 (1972) (explaining how the 1972 amendments would
"enable aggrieved persons to have charges processed under circumstances where they are
unwilling to come forward publicly for fear of economic or physical reprisals").
103. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.8.2.
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provided by Burlington Northern may make these collective strategies
more feasible. Greater protection from retaliation may make it easier
to organize one's fellow employees to support a coworker's claim or
oppose an employer's discriminatory practice.
Increased
participation in support of opposition activities could lead to the
success of individual claims in litigation. Participation by coworkers
could also drive changes in the workplace without going through the
courtroom.' 4 The more that employees are protected when they
assist one another and resist discriminatory practices, the more
pressure they may bring to bear on their employer to change these
conditions. An employer that can no longer rely on retaliation and
intimidation without the fear of being sued may be more easily
persuaded to end such practices and train supervisory personnel to
help prevent them.
While many third parties who support a claim or oppose a
discriminatory practice in Title VII discrimination claims do not take
center stage, their role is nonetheless vital in securing the freedom
from discrimination that Congress intended. The Court's new
standard for retaliation in Burlington Northern ensures that their
voices will not be silenced and that they will continue to play an
increasingly important supporting role in resolving conflicts over
discrimination in the nation's workplaces.
LORRIE E. BRADLEY

104. Burlington Northern's Impact Assessed in ABA-Hosted Teleconference, supra note
26, at A-11 to A-12 (suggesting that management training to respond to allegations of
discrimination in the workplace could be essential in addressing the expected increase in
claims under the new retaliation standard).

